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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A NATIONAL
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS ACT: A CASE
FOR STATES' RIGHTS
RICHARD W. NOBLE*
W. TERRENCE KILROY**
I. INTRODUCTION
Americans have, for nearly two hundred years, debated the ex-
tent of the States' role in our federal system. Some view the com-
plexities of the modern world as requiring that all power be cen-
tralized in Washington.' Others believe the independent sovereign
existence of the States is essential to the preservation of our basic
freedoms. Their position is stated by the noted economist Milton
Friedman:
If government is to exercise power, better in the county
than in the state, better in the state than in Washington.
If I do not like what my local community does, be it in
*Member, Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, Kansas City, Missouri; B.A., University
of Kansas, 1967; J.D., University of Wisconsin, 1970; Special Labor Counsel for the
City of Kansas City, Kansas.
**Associate, Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, Kansas City, Missouri; B.S.,
University of Kansas, 1972; M.A., University of Kansas, 1974; J.D., Washburn University,
1977.
The authors wish to acknowledge the research assistance of David Gatchell,
J.D. candidate, 1979, University of Kansas.
1. The advocates of strong national power would argue that an individual
State's interests are adequately protected by its Representatives and Senators in Con-
gress. This assumption often proves erroneous for several reasons. First, a State's in-
terest may not be accurately presented by its congressional delegation because the
representatives' views are often shaped by conflicting political pressures which may
distort their advocacy of the State's position. Secondly, State legislatures no longer
compel accountability from their Representatives or Senators. This is because reappor-
tionment decisions have rendered the redistricting process largely mechanical and the
seventeenth amendment took away from legislatures the power to elect Senators. A
third reason why States are not always protected by their Washington representatives
is that members of Congress representing one State may disagree as to the State's in-
terests and therefore will not always vote in blocks. See Tribe, Unraveling National
League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Govern-
mental Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1072 (1977) (hereinafter referred to as
Unraveling National League of Cities).
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sewage disposal, or zoning, or schools, I can move to
another local community, and though few may take this
step, the mere possibility serves as a check. If I do not
like what my state does, I can move to another. If I do not
like what Washington imposes, I have few alternatives in
this world of jealous nations.!
The Supreme Court, with its recent decision in National
League of Cities v. Usery,8 rekindled the debate by holding that
Congress cannot, by the exercise of its commerce clause powers,
enact legislation which would impair the separate and independent
existence of the States. The Court, in so holding, struck down the
1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)' which
would have extended coverage of that Act to State and municipal
employees. As if to ignore the implications of National League of
Vities, proponents of a national Public Employee Relations Act have
introduced several different bills which would dramatically affect
the relationship between the States and their employees. This arti-
cle addresses the question of whether congressional enactment of
any of the proposed Public Employee Relations Acts would amount
to an unconstitutional interference with the separate and indepen-
dent existence of our sovereign states under the standards set forth
in National League of Cities.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Employee Relations Acts
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) covers the majority
of private sector employees.5 Federal employees are covered by a
comprehensive executive order comparable with the NLRA, except
they are prohibited from striking, picketing or otherwise engaging
in work stoppages or slowdowns.'
State and municipal employees do not generally fare as well as
their counterparts in either private or federal employment. While
2. M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 3 (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1962).
3. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
4. 52 Stat. 1060 as amended (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1976)).
5. 49 Stat. 449 as amended by 61 Stat. 136 and 73 Stat. 419, 29 U.S.C. §
141 et seq. (1976).
6. Exec. Order No. 11491, 34 Fed. Reg. 17605 (1970) (promulgated by Presi-
dent Nixon on Aug. 26, 1971) as amended by Exec. Order No. 11616, 36 Fed. Reg.
17319 (Aug. 26, 1971), Exec. Order No. 11636, 36 Fed. Reg. 24901 (Dec. 17, 1971), Exec.
Order No. 11838, 40 Fed. Reg. 5743, 7391 (Feb. 7 and 20, 1975), and Exec. Order No.
11901, 41 Fed. Reg. 4807 (Feb. 2, 1976).
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most States have provided for public sector bargaining, a few States
still prohibit bargaining between a public employer and its
employees.' Several States which do permit collective bargaining im-
pose no obligation on the public employer to bargain. In these
States, the right to unilaterally alter any labor agreement with a
public employee representative has been reserved unto the public
employer. Those States permitting public employees collective
bargaining have one of two basic types of statutes: those merely re-
quiring the public employer to meet and confer with the bargaining
representative and those mandating it to bargain collectively in
good faith.' Despite the differences between public and private
employment, an increasing number of States have adopted modified
versions of the NLRA.' While almost all States prohibit public
employee strikes, a few States have recently accorded public
employees the right to strike under certain limited circumstances.
Labor leaders, both public and private, and various public
employee organizations have called upon Congress to enact federal
legislation providing uniform organizational and bargaining rights
for all public employees. The first session of the Ninety-Fifth Con-
gress saw the introduction of two such bills. One bill would remove
the NLRA exemption granted to State and municipal employers.10
The other bill would afford public employees rights similar to those
granted by the NLRA via a Public Employee Relations Act.1 This
latter proposal establishes a National Public Employee Relations
Commission to administer the Act. The National Education Associa-
tion has also proposed legislation which differs from the others
chiefly in its unique impasse procedures. While none of these bills
were passed during the Ninety-Fifth Congress, organized labor
7. Approximately three-fourths of the States have passed such legislation.
For a further breakdown, see McCann and Smiley, The National Labor Relations Act
and the Regulation of Public Employee Collective Bargaining, 13 HARV. J. LEGIs. 479,
495-514 (1976).
8. Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MICH.
L. REv. 885 (1974).
9. Id. at 916.
10. H.R. 777 introduced Jan. 4, 1977 by Rep. Thompson.
11. H.R. 1987 introduced Jan. 17, 1977 by Rep. Roybal.
12. See Chanin, A Federal Collective Bargaining Statute for Public
Employees: Redesigning the N.E.A. Proposal to Meet the Requirements of National
League of Cities v. Usery (1976) (a copy of this report may be obtained by writing the
National Education Association, 1201 16th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036) (herein-
after cited as N.E.A. Proposal).
13. While organized labor is still seeking passage of federal legislation to
govern State and municipal employee bargaining, events of the 95th Congress have
diminished their hopes of its passage. The defeat of common-situs picketing by the
1978]
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has committed itself to the eventual passage of a Public Employee
Relations Act.1"
Extension of the coverage of the NLRA has closely paralleled
that of the FLSA. Thus, in 1974, when organized labor obtained an
extension of the FLSA to cover State and municipal employees, it
was only a matter of time until a similar extension of the NLRA was
sought. An anaylsis of the Court's treatment of the amendments to
the FLSA, particularly National League of Cities, aids one in
understanding the constitutional analysis the Court is likely to
employ if called upon to determine the constitutionality of a Na-
tional Public Employee Relations Act.
B. The Fair Labor Standards Act
The FLSA was enacted by Congress in 1938 pursuant to its
power to regulate commerce between the States.15 The Act provides
for, among other things, a federal minimum wage,"6 maximum
hours, 7 and overtime compensation. 8 Public employees were exemp-
ted from the coverage of the Act. 9 The FLSA was upheld in United
States v. Darby as a legitimate exercise of congressional power
under the commerce clause.'
In 1966 the FLSA was amended, expanding the definition of
employer to include States and municipalities when operating public
hospitals and schools."1 This extension was ratified in Maryland v.
Wirtz' on the basis that federal regulation is not less valid because
House forced organized labor to reduce its list of demands. The original list included a
three dollar minimum wage, repeal of Section 14(b) of the N.L.R.A. (the so-called
"right-to-work" provision), a "Labor Reform" act, common-situs picketing and federal
public sector legislation. With the Senate's recent action sending the "Labor Reform"
bill back to committee, no meaningful action on federal public sector legislation will
occur in the 95th Congress. Legislation will no doubt be reintroduced in the 96th Ses-
sion of Congress to add public employees to the N.L.R.A.'s coverage. Its future will de-
pend on whether organized labor can regain its clout with Congress.
14. NEW YoRK TIMES, Feb. 23, 1977, § B at 5.
15. 52 Stat. 1060 as amended (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1976)).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976).
17. Id at § 207.
18. Id
19. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676 § 3(d), 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1976)). States were exempted under this section from the definition
of "employer."
20. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
21. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Publ. L. No. 89-601, 75 Stat.
67 amending 29 U.S.C. § 203 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), 203(r), 203(s), (1976)).
22. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
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a State or municipality is involved, if the State is engaged in an ac-
tivity which is covered by federal labor law when performed in the
private sector.' Justice Douglas dissented, stating that constitu-
tional principles of federalism insulated the States from the exercise
of Congress' commerce clause powers. Justice Douglas believed such
a limitation on Congress' otherwise plenary commerce powers was
necessary to protect State sovereignty.4
In 1974 the Act was again amended to include almost all public
employees other than elected public officials and certain staff
members.25 Additionally, special maximum hour and overtime provi-
sions were promulgated for fire and police personnel.2" The National
League of Cities, numerous cities and States, and the National
Governors' Conference challenged Congress' right to bring States
and municipalities within the coverage of the FLSA.27
C. National League of Cities v. Usery
The District Court felt obliged to follow Maryland v. Wirtz
despite its concern that the 1974 amendments would intrude upon
the States' performance of their governmental functions. Following
Maryland v. Wirtz, the District Court required only that the state
activity affect interstate commerce and that the federal legislation
have a "rational basis" underlying its enactment.
28
The National League of Cities consistently contended that the
1974 amendments conflicted with nearly 200 years of federalism and
amounted to a federal takeover of the essential functions of State
and local governments.2
The question presented here is not one just of protection
of State governmental power as sloganized under the
term "states' rights." The question here is one of protec-
tion of our Federalist system of Government against the
centralization of power the Constitution was designed to
prevent. To reduce State and local governments to their
23. Id. at 197.
24. Id. at 204-05.
25. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat.
55, amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 203, 207 (1974).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 207(k) (1974).
27. For a detailed listing of all parties to the suit, see National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 836 n.7 (1976).
28. National League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826 (D.D.C. 1974).
29. Brief of Appellant at 51, National Leagueof Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976).
1978]
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inferior status of reporting to and being governed by a
Federal agency on such an important ultimate matter as
terms and conditions of employment of all employees is
not envisioned by the Federal partnership system."
Maryland v. Wirtz, in the National League's opinion, should have
been overruled, for federal legislation interfering with State and
local governments could not be justified simply because a rational
basis existed for its enactment. Instead, courts should examine such
legislation with "careful and meticulous scrutiny" in order to deter-
mine if constitutional standards of federalism have been met."
The Secretary of Labor asserted that, "[t]he rational basis test
stated in Maryland v. Wirtz is the proper standard for assessing the
constitutionality of legislation, unless it threatens to infringe the
personal liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights."' Relying on
United States v. Darby," the Secretary sought to negate the plain
meaning of the tenth amendment by asserting that it was merely
declaratory of the relationship between the national and State
governments.'
The Supreme Court rejected the Secretary of Labor's inter-
pretation of the tenth amendment. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for
the majority, ' enunciated the familiar axiom that Congress has
plenary power to regulate commerce." However, while an enactment
may be within Congress' grant of legislative authority under the
commerce clause, the legislation may be invalid because it offends
other constitutional rights." Congressional power under the com-
merce clause may not impair the sovereign power of the States in
the discharge of their obligation as a State for:
There are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every
state government which may not be impaired by Con-
gress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant
of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because
30. Id. at 54.
31. Id. at 94-96.
32. Brief of Appellee Department of Labor at 59-60, National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
33. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
34. Brief of Appellee Department of Labor at 53, National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
35. Justice Rehnquist spoke for four members of the Court with the deciding
vote cast by Justice Blackmun in a separate concurrence.
36. 426 U.S. 833, 840 (1976).
37. Id. at 841.
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the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority
in that manner."
"One undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the States'
power to determine the wages . . . [and] hours of its employees."' 1
Since the State's right to make these fundamental determinations is
essential to its continued existence, Congress may not impair the
State's exercise of its sovereign wisdom.'0 The State's unfettered
authority to determine the wages and hours of its employees is an
inherent element of State sovereignty, for the ceding of this authority
to an extraneous governmental body would: (1) increase costs to the
States, ' (2) necessitate cutbacks in essential governmental services,42
and (3) displace the States' policies regarding the manner in which
they will structure delivery of the governmental services their
citizens require.4 3 Accordingly, the 1974 amendments to the FLSA
"impermissibly interfere[d] with the integral governmental functions
of [the States]."" In reaching its decision in National League of
Cities, the Court overruled Maryland v. Wirtz45 and required an ap-
proach which renders unconstitutional any legislation impermissibly
interfering with the essential functions of the State in its capacity
as a State.
Justice Blackmun, concurring, read the majority as establishing
a balancing test between federal and purely State interests.4 6 His
approach would "not outlaw federal power in such areas as en-
vironmental protection, where the federal interest is demonstrably
greater and where state compliance with imposed federal standards
would be essential. '4 7
38. Id. at 845.
39. Id
40. Id.
41. The City of Cape Girardeau, Missouri, estimated its fire protection budget
would nearly double because of regulations issued under the Act. 426 U.S. 833, 846
(1976).
42. The City of Inglewood, California, stated it would be forced to curtail its
affirmative action program providing employment opportunities for men and women
interested in law enforcement careers. Additionally, the Inglewood Police Department
would have to cut back job training programs due to additional costs. 426 U.S. 833, 847
(1976).
43. 426 U.S. 833, 847-48 (1976).
44. Id at 851.
45. Id at 853-55. The Court distinguished Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542
(1975), which upheld the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, because a temporary
freeze on wages of State and municipal employees was an emergency measure to
counter severe inflation threatening the national economy. 426 U.S. at 852-53.
46. 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
47. Id
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While Justice Blackmun's suggestion that the majority has
adopted a "balancing test" is probably correct, Justice Rehnquist's
opinion reveals an attempt to isolate essential State governmental
functions48 to provide them with enhanced protection."9 Any federal
intrusion with these functions would therefore be subjected to
"close scrutiny" to insure that the essential elements of State
sovereignty are left unimpaired. Identified as an essential element
of State sovereignty is the State's power to control the wages and
hours of its employees;' as such, any federal intrusion would seem-
ingly require a compelling national interest.5' Where an overriding
national interest exists, however, such as eradicating discrimina-
tion52 or environmental protection, the legislation would require only
that it satisfy a "rational basis" test.
Justice Brennan, in a strong dissent, asserted that the majority
opinion narrowed the scope of the commerce power.' In fact, the
majority did not quarrel with Congress' plenary power to regulate
commerce, so long as the activity affects commerce among the
States or with foreign nations. However, when a congressional
enactment impermissibly interferes with the sovereignty of the
48. "We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty
attaching to every state government which may not be impaired by Congress .
426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976).
49. Unraveling National League of Cities, supra note 1, at 1074. Professor
Tribe argues the Court's willingness to protect the State in its role as employer and
not the State in its role as lawmaker is difficult to justify. He asserts the political
safeguards against federal burdens on State treasuries when acting as employer are
likely to be greater than intrusions on the State's ability to regulate private conduct
within its borders. This is because the State and its taxpayers are more likely to pro-
test additional burdens than increased federal regulation which relieves the State of
regulatory duties. The argument is well taken and suggests avenues for further expan-
sion of the protection Usery affords the States. Perhaps the Court will one day reapply
the pre-1937 Court's commerce power analysis which restricted federal regulation of
intra-state private activities.
50. 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976).
51. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), reinforces this view. In Bishop, the
Supreme Court deferred to State law in determining whether a public employee has a
vested property right in his employment. Justice Stevens, speaking for the majority,
stated: "The ultimate control of state personnel relationships is, and will remain, with
the States." 426 U.S. at 349 n.14.
52. See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (§ 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 applies to state
and local governments); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 447 (1976) (eleventh amendment
does not bar a Title VII (Civil Rights Act of 1964) action against a municipality).
53. 426 U.S. 833, 868 (1976).
54. Id. at 840.
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States acting as States, the tenth amendment shields the State from
the interference.
Justice Brennan also claimed that the majority opinion created
a "novel state sovereignty doctrine," whereas the tenth amendment
is merely declaratory and was never intended as a substantial check
on federal power.' Yet, analysis of the intent of the framers of the
Constitution reveals that the concept of State sovereignty was clearly
intended as a limitation on the exercise of congressional power.
III. A HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE CONCEPT OF FEDERALISM EMBODIED
WITHIN THE TENTH AMENDMENT AS A SUBSTANTIVE
CHECK ON CONGRESSIONAL POWER
The proposition that the tenth amendment is merely
declaratory and not a substantive check on the power of Congress
was most succinctly enunciated in United States v. Darby,5 where
the Supreme Court stated:
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained
which has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the
history of this adoption to suggest that it was more than
declaratory of the relationship between the national and
state governments as it had been established by the Con-
stitution before the amendment or that its purpose was
other than to allay fears that the new government might
seek to exercise powers not granted ....
From the beginning and for many years the amend-
ment has been construed as not depriving the national
government of authority to resort to all means for the ex-
ercise of the granted powers which are appropriate and
plainly adapted to the permitted end."
This decision eliminated the tenth amendment as a substantive
check on federal power. The Court, in reaching its result, ignored
historical evidence that the tenth amendment was promulgated
specifically to prevent congressional overreaching into the internal
affairs of the States."
55. Id. at 862-63.
56. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
57. Id. at 124.
58. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 868 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). "We tend to forget that the Court invalidated legislation during the Great
Depression, not solely under the Due Process Clause, but also and primarily under the
Commerce clause and Tenth Amendment. It may have been the eventual abandonment
of that overly restrictive construction of the commerce power that spelled defeat for
1978]
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An analysis of the Constitution reveals a scheme of federalism
woven throughout the Constitution which was intended to limit con-
gressional power. The Supreme Court has, except for two epochs,
strongly defended the sovereign rights of the States. The Court's
decisions have at times been couched in terms of intergovernmental
immunity or in terms of a restrictive interpretation of the commerce
power. Nevertheless, the concept that the tenth amendment pre-
serves State sovereignty by acting as a substantive check on the
power of the federal government has had continuing vitality.
A. The Constitutional Convention
One of the central issues facing delegates to the 1787 Constitu-
tional Convention was how to strengthen the central government
while simultaneously insuring the continued existence of the
sovereign States. 9 Strong sentiments were expressed on both sides
of the issue." An early draft of the Constitution stated:
To provide, as may become necessary, from time to time,
for the well managing and securing the common property
and general interests and welfare of the United States in
such manner as shall not interfere with the government of
individual States, in matters which respect only their in-
ternal police, or for which their individual authority may
be competent."
Although this version of the Constitution was not accepted, it is
worth noting for at least two reasons. The framers of the Constitu-
tion were concerned about the possibility of congressional encroach-
ment on State government. As one of the members of the Constitu-
tional Convention warned:
The State legislatures also ought to have some means of
defending themselves against encroachments of the Na-
tional Government. In every other department we have
the Court-packing plan, and preserved the integrity of this institution . . . see e.g.,
United States v. Darby ... ." Id&
59. See J. MADISON. JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (E.H. Scott ed.
1970) (hereinafter referred to as JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION).
60. Alexander Hamilton, an ardent supporter of a strong national govern-
ment, stated: "[T]he [g]eneral power, whatever be its form, if it preserves itself, must
swallow up the state powers." Another delegate proposed doing away with the States
altogether. Id. at 148-49. Madison, on the other hand, believed States' rights should be
preserved as carefully as trial by jury. Id. at 280.
61. Proposed by the Committee of Detail whose members were delegates
Rutledge, Randolph, Gorham, Ellsworth and Wilson. Id. at 585.
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studiously endeavored to provide for its self-defense. Shall
we leave the States alone unprovided with the means for
this purpose . . .?
Many of the State ratifying conventions voiced great opposition to
the Constitution because of the failure to provide protection for
State sovereignty. This opposition culminated in the tenth amend-
ment, 3 embodying the check on Congress which many of the State
ratifying conventions felt was essential.
B. State Ratifying Conventions
The Constitution ran into formidable opposition in the State
ratifying conventions. The Federalists, proponents of a strong
national government, vigorously asserted that the tenth amendment
would be merely redundant. They argued that the Constitution,
without the tenth amendment, would still reserve to the States all
powers not yielded to the national government." The State conven-
tions were not persuaded by the Federalist logic. Patrick Henry, a
leader of the Antifederalist opposition, insisted America would
follow the path of European nations - an ever-increasing flow of
power to the central government - unless the national government
was limited by explicit substantive checks on the exercise of its
power over subordinate units of government. He stated:
I repeat, that all nations have adopted this construc-
tion-that all rights not expressly and unequivocally
reserved to the people are impliedly and incidentally
relinquished to rulers, as necessarily unseparable from the
delegated powers .... If you intend to reserve your in-
alienable rights, you must have the most express stipula-
tion; where if implication be allowed, you are ousted of
those rights .... It was expressly declared in our Con-
federation that every right was retained by the states,
respectively, which was not given up to the government
of the United States. But there is no such thing here. You,
62. 1& at 130.
63. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST., amend. X.
64. E.g., delegate James Wilson, a leading Federalist and later a Supreme
Court Justice during the Marshall era, argued that since Congress was not given the
power to regulate the press, no amendment guaranteeing freedom of the press was
necessary. 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 529 (1971).
19781
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therefore, by natural and unavoidable implication, give up
your rights to the federal government."
The Antifederalists carried the day, and the Constitution was
not ratified until there were assurances that the first Congress
would adopt a Bill of Rights. No less than eight states suggested
amendments which, in one form or another," would have expressly
reserved to the States all powers not specifically granted Congress
by the Constitution. A safeguard protecting the States' sovereignty
was believed to be an essential ingredient for the continued viability
of the grand new scheme of government. These suggestions
culminated in the eventual adoption of the tenth amendment," which
was proposed by more States ratifying conventions than any of the
other fundamental liberties contained within the Bill of Rights."
C. Judicial Construction of the Tenth Amendment
The Supreme Court's treatment of the tenth amendment has
varied depending on the composition of the Court. The Court has,
for the most part, been sensitive to the sovereign rights of the
States and has given full force and effect to the tenth amendment.
During periods of national crisis, however, the Court has favored a
strong national government by emphasizing the commerce clause.
These shifts by the Court can be separated into three distinct
periods which coincide with periods of national strife when a strong
national government was perceived as essential for the preservation
of the Union.
The initial departure from the clear meaning of the tenth
amendment occurred during the tenure of Chief Justice John Mar-
shall, at a time when the fledgling federal government needed
strong support to ensure its survival. In McCulloch v. Maryland9
65. I& at 797-98.
66. The New York, Massachusetts, Virginia, New Hampshire and South
Carolina Conventions all voted recommendatory amendments. The minority block of
the Pennsylvania Convention proposed amendments. The Maryland Convention ap-
pointed a committee to draft suggested amendments. North Carolina voted not to
ratify the Constitution until it was amended. A conditional list of amendments was
proposed to aid this effort. It was not until the First Congress adopted the Bill of
Rights that North Carolina ratified the Constitution. See id& at 983.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall held:
"[T]he government of the United States, then, though limited in its powers is supreme;
and its laws, when made in pursuance of the Constitution, form the supreme law of the
land, 'anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstand-
ing."' Id. at 406.
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and Gibbons v. Ogden, 70 the Court established the overriding
authority of the national government by holding that the commerce
clause gave Congress plenary power to regulate commerce between
the States irrespective of any apparent limitation in the tenth
amendment.
A new era began upon the death of Chief Justice Marshall, dur-
ing which time the Court expressly recognized the tenth amendment
as limiting the power of Congress. During this period, which lasted
approximately one hundred years, the Court restored the intended
vitality of the tenth amendment 7' by holding that the powers reserved
to the States comprise a substantive limitation on otherwise con-
stitutionaracts of Congress.7 ' Thus, a national income tax, otherwise
constitutional, could not be levied upon the salaries of State officials.
Since this power was not expressly granted to Congress, it was
reserved to the States by the tenth amendment. In Collector v.
Day,73 the Court stated:
The general government, and the states, although both
exist within the same territorial limits, are separable and
distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independent-
ly of each other, within their respective spheres. The
former, in its appropriate sphere, is supreme; but the
states within the limits of their powers not granted, or, in
the language of the tenth amendment, "reserved," are as
70. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). In Gibbons, the Chief Justice went even fur-
ther in stating the federal government's powers: "[Tihis power (to regulate commerce)
like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than prescribed in the Constitution." I&
at 9.
71. The first indication was the 1837 decision of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) 102 (1837), in which the Court, relying on the tenth amendment, stated:
We choose rather to plant ourselves on what we consider impregnable
positions. They are these: that a State has the same undeniable and
unlimited jurisdiction over all persons and things, within its territorial
limits, as any foreign nation; where that jurisdiction is not surrendered or
restrained by the Constitution of the United States .... That all those
powers which related to merely municipal legislation, or what may,
perhaps, properly be called internal police, are not thus surrendered or
restrained; and that, consequently in relation to these, the authority of a
state is complete, unqualified and exclusive.
Id at 139.
72. See U.S. v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1869); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 700 (1868); Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1868); Kentucky v. Den-
nison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860); Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1853); The
License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
73. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870).
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independent of the general government as that govern-
ment within its sphere is independent of the states.7'
The Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart5 and subsequent cases7"
perceived the tenth amendment as shielding the States from an ero-
sion of their sovereign powers by the federal government. Congress,
during this period, was limited to exercising its commerce clause
powers to regulate conduct exclusively within the private sector.
The Great Depression again caused a general sentiment favor-
ing a strong central government. Critical economic conditions
demanded immediate and far-reaching action on an unprecedented
scale. The Supreme Court initially resisted the rush to create an
omnipotent federal government. However, President Roosevelt's
threats of court-packing and appointments to the Court ensured that
the national government would assume more authority. The Court
enlarged Congress' power when it decided in United States v.
California71 that a state-owned railroad was subject to the Federal
Safety Appliance Act. California argued that it could not constitu-
tionally be subject to the provisions of the Act since it, in its
sovereign capacity, was engaged in discharging a public function."8
However, in the words of Chief Justice Stone, "[T]here is no ...
limitation upon the plenary power to regulate commerce. The state
can no more deny the power if its exercise has been authorized by
Congress than can an individual."7
The Court, between 1937 and 1941, broadened the scope of the
commerce clause by emasculating the tenth amendment." Darby, in
overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, relegated the tenth amendment
to a "mere truism."'" Darby reached its apex in Maryland v. Wirtz,82
where the Court stated it "will not carve upon the commerce power
74. Id at 124.
75. 247 U.S. 251 (1911).
76. E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (excise tax on the sale
of coal produced by non-members of a coal code established by federal regulation);
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (commerce power not suf-
ficient to regulate poultry); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (excise
taxes on profits of factories employing child labor).
77. 297 U.S. 175 (1935).
78. Id at 183.
79. Id at 185.
80. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S.
619 (1937); Stewart Machine Company v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); N.L.R.B. v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
81. 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941).
82. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
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to protect enterprises indistinguishable in their effect on commerce
from private business, simply because those enterprises happen to
be run by the states.""
However, the pendulum began its swing back toward a recogni-
tion of State sovereignty in the mid-1970's with the Court's decision
in Fry v. United States." In upholding the constitutionality of the
Economic Stabilization Act as applied to State and local govern-
ments, the Court recognized the continuing vitality of the tenth
amendment.
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a
'truism' stating merely that 'all is retained which is not
surrendered.' United States v. Darby, . . . it is not
without significance. The Amendment expressly declares
the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise
power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or
their ability to function effectively in a federal system ....
The language in Fry foreshadowed the Court's decision a year later
in National League of Cities v. Usery.
IV. MAY CONGRESS CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPOSE ON THE STATE
AN ACT REGULATING STATE AND MUNICIPAL
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS?
There were two proposals before the Ninety-fifth Congress for
the federal government to regulate state and municipal employees.
One would simply delete the exemption status of state and local
governments under the National Labor Relations Act. States and
municipalities would then be regulated by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board. The other proposal would create a separate Public
Employee Relations Board to regulate only states and their political
subdivisions. The former proposal is based entirely on Congress'
commerce power. The latter proposal is based on both the commerce
power and Congress' power under the fourteenth amendment. In ad-
dition, one Congressman has suggested that Congress utilize its
spending power to force the states to adopt the federal legislation.
Application of these proposals under any of the suggested federal
powers indicates serious interference with the concepts of
federalism embodied in the Constitution and recently enunciated in
National League of Cities.
83. I. at 198-99.
84. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
85. 1& at 547 n.7.
86. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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A. The Commerce Power as a Basis for Congressional Enactment
of an Act Regulating State and Municipal Employee Relations
The commerce power is most often suggested as a basis for
federal regulation of state and municipal employees. Arguing that
current state regulation leads to strikes and other forms of strife
and unrest, it is suggested that the result is an obstruction of the
flow of commerce.' This analysis, as applied to the private sector,
succeeded in sustaining enactment of the National Labor Relations
Act." However, the additional factor of state sovereignty presents
problems not passed upon by the courts forty years ago. Serious in-
terference with the States' ability to provide essential governmental
services for their citizens is violative of the federalism embodied in
National League of Cities.
An essential element of State sovereignty is the authority to
make those fundamental employment decisions upon which the
States' systems of performance must rest." As the National League
of Cities so aptly stated in its brief:
In our Nation, Governments are bundles of law powers.
Governments act only through their employees. One of
their most vital internal and intimate governmental func-
tions is, therefore, the terms and conditions of employ-
ment that they prescribe for their employees. 'No more
vital internal function of government exists for States and
cities than control of their employees and the budget
items relating to said employees.'"
If Congress were allowed to withdraw from the States the exclusive
authority to make fundamental employment decisions, there would
be little left of the States' "separate and independent existence."'1
Illustrative of the extent to which the proponents of this legislation
want the federal government to usurp the States' power to establish
its employees' terms and conditions of employment is Section 13 of
the proposed National Public Employee Relations Act:
This act shall supersede all previous statutes concerning
this subject matter and shall preempt all contrary local or-
dinances, Executive orders, legislation, rules, or regula-
87. H.R. 1987, National Public Employee Relations Act, § 1.
88. N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
89. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976).
90. Brief of Appellant at 56, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976).
91. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976).
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tions adopted by any State or any of its political subdivi-
sions or agents such as a personnel board or civil service
commission."
The provisions of the proposed legislation which require
recognition of an exclusive employee representative, classification of
employees, and collective bargaining would substantially impair the
States' unilateral authority to make fundamental employment deci-
sions. The requirement that a State recognize an exclusive employee
representative cedes to a third party the right to participate in the
process by which the State will structure integral operations and
deliver traditional governmental services." Congress may not exer-
cise its commerce clause power so as to limit the States' prerogative
to determine how it will administer its integral functions." Congress
similarly may not, under the guise of a public employee bargaining
law, grant to a third party rights beyond congressional exercise.15
Application of the NLRA to state and municipal employees
could require governments to bargain collectively with employee
representatives concerning wages, hours and conditions of employ-
ment." The duty to bargain has required employers to consult with
the employee representatives prior to reducing an employee work
force." Application of this requirement to the public sector would re-
quire legislatures to halt the legislative process to consult with a
bargaining representative prior to altering or restructuring delivery
92. H.R. 1987, introduced by Rep. Roybal Jan. 17, 1977, at 33.
93. The ceding of essential legislative decisions to outside parties would
violate the delegation doctrine. Legislatures are not permitted to be divested of
legislative decisions. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); United States
v. Shreveport Grain & Elev. Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932). Although the federal courts
have been reluctant to apply the delegation doctrine in recent years, the doctrine is
viable in the state courts. Indeed, recent cases have utilized the delegation doctrine to
invalidate transfer of legislative power concerning state and municipal employees to
arbitration panels. School Board of City of Richmond v. Parkam, 1977-78 CCH PBC
36,269 (Va. S. Ct. 1978); Maryland Classified Employees Ass'n., Inc. v. Anderson,
1977-78 CCH PBC 36,115 (1977); cf. Transit Union, Div. 540 v. Mercer Cty. Improve-
ment Authority, 1977-78 CCH PBC 36,270 (1978).
94. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
95. Id.
96. 29 U.S.C. § 158(aX5) (1976).
97. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203 (1964). In
Fibreboard, the Surpeme Court held that an employer could not subcontract out work
without first bargaining in good faith with the bargaining representative concerning
the proposal. The employer must enable the bargaining unit an opportunity to lower
its costs or offer its services in such a manner so as to meet the needs of the
employer. See also Civil Service Ass'n., Local 400, SEIU, AFL-CIO v. City and County
of San Francisco, 1977-78 CCH PBC 36,084 (1977).
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of essential governmental services." If a proposal were before the
legislature to eliminate a state agency and contract out the work or
give it to another agency, the legislature would be forced to halt
hearings on the bill and consult with the employee representative to
insure that no violations of the duty to bargain in good faith occur-
red."
The NLRA's duty to bargain in good faith could deny elected
officials the right to engage in public debate concerning their posi-
tions on public employee salaries, manpower and other terms and
conditions of employment. Governors and mayors frequently have
decisive roles in bargaining with State and local employee unions. A
mayor who campaigns on a platform proposing limits on public
employee benefits faces a serious dilemma. For the mayor to
bargain on a union proposal exceeding that benefit level would be
political suicide. On the other hand, his refusal to bargain on the
proposal would amount to an unfair labor practice as a refusal to
bargain.1" The people could thereby be denied critical information
necessary to make an informed choice at the polls. Yet, there can be
little doubt that the recent financial difficulties of many of our
States and cities have made salaries and manpower utilization issues
of genuine concern to taxpayers."'
The proposed legislation also provides for continuing federal
supervision of the State's management of personnel who perform in-
98. Current state statutes governing public employees provide that employers
shall meet and confer with the exclusive bargaining representatives, but this duty has
not generally been extended to require consultations mandated by the Fibreboard
decision, supra at note 97. See V.A.M.S. § 105.520 (Supp. 1977); Kan. Stat. Ann. §
75-4327 (1977); cf. Los Angeles City Civil Service Comm. v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles Cty., 1977-78 CCH PBC 36,058 (1977) (Duty to meet and confer requires
more than opportunity to present views at public meeting concerning proposed rules
dealing with layoffs of public employees). While the possibility exists the N.L.R.B.
might not require such extensive bargaining, there are no assurances that such an
onerous duty would not be placed on the public employer.
99. The National Public Employee Relations Act also has the requirement of
good faith in bargaining with the employees' exclusive representative. H.R. 1987 § 5(5).
100. Lieberman, Neglected Issues in Public Employee Collective Bargaining
Legislation, Education Resource Information Center: E.D. 105, 615, p. 4 (1975).
101. George Gallup reports politicians can win votes by attacking public
employee unions. See Public Employee Unions Push to Catch Up, BUSINESS WEEK, p.
49, col. 3 (Aug. 1, 1977). This prediction has proven accurate with the recent New York
City mayoral contest where U.S. Rep. Ed Koch was successful in his quest for election
by attacking municipal unions, their high salaries and pension. See Hertzberg, Even
the Democrats Sound Conservative in Mayoral Campaign, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 1977
at 1, col. 1.
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tegral government functions by the NLRB or the Public Employee
Relations Boards. These Boards would have power to adjudicate and
remedy alleged unfair labor practices. Thus, the proposed legislation
interferes with the right of the State to manage and control its
employees by substituting the judgment of a federal bureaucracy for
the wisdom of the sovereign State. The federal government would,
if these proposals are enacted, be charged with determining
whether or not a State employee has been disciplined or discharged
for cause. The federal bureaucracy could, in the event it finds there
was no cause for the dismissal, order reinstatement with full back
pay to an unsatisfactory employee. If the United States Civil Ser-
vice Commission is an example of the efficacy of federal regulation
of the employment relationship, there is ample reason to fear a
substantial impairment of the States' ability to deliver traditional
governmental services."2
Several other interferences with the States' ability to deliver
essential services are seen in the proposed National Public
Employee Relations Act. Section 10 provides for mediation and fact
finding. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service would have
power under the Act to assign a mediator upon request of either
party or upon its own motion. The mediator would have the power
to establish dates and places of hearings, issue subpoenas, ad-
minister oaths and provide for full trial-type hearings upon the
issues in dispute. During the mediation process, there could be no
unilateral change in terms or conditions of employment for a period
of 60 days in order to "permit the successful resolution of the
dispute." The mediation process would, therefore, cede to the
federal government broad powers over the State's bargaining pro-
cedure with its employees. If a State's desire to restructure its
essential governmental services caused a dispute between the State
and its employees, the mediation service could stay the State's abili-
ty to ration its services by using the 60 day status quo period. This
mediation procedure could, therefore, intrude deeply into the State's
ability to render to its citizens the essential governmental services
required.
Proponents of a national act to regulate public employees argue
that it would not impinge upon the separate and independent ex-
istence of the States, but would merely set forth procedures by
which the State could voluntarily bargain with its employees regard-
102. House, Civil Service Rule Book May Bury Carter's Bid to Achieve Effi-
ciency, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 26, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
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ing their terms and conditions of employment.' This argument in-
dicates ignorance of the bargaining process. Even the N.E.A., a
leading proponent of the proposed legislation, admits:
[Pirocedure often is the gateway to substance, and there
are . . . aspects of the N.E.A. proposal which would in-
trude deeply into the authority of the states to determine
the substantive terms and conditions of employment of
the persons who work for them.1
Eighty to eighty-five percent of a State's budget is consumed by
salaries.115 If the federal government can require a State to collec-
tively bargain with its employees, the cost of providing basic
governmental services would rise dramatically, for a natural result
of the bargaining process is higher wages. Higher wages could
result in the need to reduce personnel with a consequent reduction
in services. New York City's current fiscal dilemma illustrates the
fact that requiring a public employer to collectively bargain with its
employees will adversely affect the State's ability to render essen-
tial governmental services.
Accordingly, enactment of legislation governing state and
municipal employees would present serious intrusions upon state
sovereignty. These instrusions could seriously impair the States'
ability to offer and structure essential services required by their
citizens. Therefore, Congress would not have authority under the
commerce power as both proposals would impermissibly interfere
with the separate and independent existence of the states and
violate standards promulgated by National League of Cities.
B. The Congressional Spending Power as a Basis for Constitu-
tionally Enacting a Public Employee Relations Act Which is
Otherwise Prohibited Under the Commerce Clause
The Court, in National League of Cities, declined to express its
view as to "whether different results might be obtained if Congress
seeks to affect integral operations of state government by exercis-
103. Fox, Federal Public Sector Labor Relations Legislation. The Aftermath
of National League of Cities v. Usery, 26 KAN. L. REV. 105, 117 (1977). Fox believes the
proposed federal legislation would not in and of itself cause additional fiscal burdens.
Rather, any cost increases would be a result of a voluntary agreement between the
governing body and the public employee organization. However, this view ignores the
realities of the increased bargaining power afforded employee organizations which
would result from the proposed legislation's passage.
104. N.E.A. Proposal, supra, note 12 at 16.
105. See Appellant National League of Cities Jurisdictional Statement, p. 10.
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ing authority granted it under" the spending power.'" Thus, the
Court left open the possibility that Congress might have properly
enacted the 1974 amendments to the FLSA had it acted pursuant to
its spending power. One Congressman has suggested Congress
should circumvent the National League of Cities decision by condi-
tioning the disbursement of revenue sharing monies on acceptance
of a Public Employee Relations Act.101
Typically, the spending power is exercised to provide money
for the States to implement programs in accordance with federal
guidelines, or to require State compliance with federal standards by
threatening the loss of existing funding.1" Cities and States which
rely on revenue sharing to fund their budgets can thereby be coerced
into complying with the dictates of the federal government. Con-
gress could theoretically, under its spending power, enact legislation
otherwise constitutionally impermissible.
Congress may not however, by the exercise of its spending
power, erode the functions essential to the States' separate and in-
dependent existence. The Supreme Court in United States v.
Butler'09 held that Congress cannot impose through economic coer-
cion legislation which is otherwise unconstitutional. The Court in
Butler struck down the Agricultural Adjustment Act which required
farmers to curtail production as a condition to receiving financial
grants. The Administration argued that the farmer's election to cur-
tail production in order to receive the benefits of the Act was volun-
tary and not the result of coercion. The Court, in rejecting this con-
tention, stated:
106. 426 U.S. 833, 852 n.17 (1976).
107. Rep. Erlenborn in remarks before the Federal Relations Network of the
National School Board Ass'n., Feb. 8, 1977. Court Decisions in the Public Sector,
MIDWEST MONITOR 8 (May/June 1977). On December 17, 1977 the A.F.L.-C.I.O. came out
in support of amending the N.L.R.A. to include state and local government workers
through Congress' spending power if the commerce clause would not constitutionally
support such an enactment. Public Employee Bargaining (CCH) No. 3, Jan. 3, 1978, p.
6.
108. A recent example of both approaches is the Emergency Energy Conserva-
tion Act, Pub. L. 93-239, 87 Stat. 1046 (1974). Section 2 of the Act conditions receipt of
federal highway aid funds on each State establishing a 55 mile per hour speed limit
upon all public highways within its jurisdiction. Section 3 makes available to the States
90 percent of the cost of approved projects to encourage car pools in urban areas.
109. 297 U.S. 1 (1936). The Argicultural Adjustment Act required farmers to
agree to curtail production as a condition to receipt of federal grants. The Court held
this was coercion and additionally that agricultural production was a matter for the
States to regulate via the tenth amendment.
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The farmer, of course, may refuse to comply, but the
price of such refusal is the loss of benefits. The amount of-
fered is intended to be sufficient to exert pressure on him
to agree to the proposed regulation. The power to confer
or withhold unlimited benefits is the power to coerce or
destroy. . . . This is coercion by economic pressure. The
asserted power of choice is illusory."'
While Butler involved an individual as opposed to a State, the tenth
amendment was viewed as a substantive check on the spending
power. The Court, in construing the Social Security Act subsequent
to Butler, extended to the States the principle that Congress may
not by economic coercion constitutionally enact legislation otherwise
unconstitutional,' even though the Court did not declare the Social
Security Act unconstitutional."' The Supreme Court has never
reversed its decision in Butler. Although authority exists suggesting
Butler is of limited persuasiveness,"' these objections to Butler's
viability are laid to rest by National League of Cities.
The tenth amendment, as a result of National League of Cities,
has again been recognized as a shield protecting the States from
federal interference with their exercise of traditional sovereign
110. Id. at 70-71.
111. Stewart Machine v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Carmichael v. Southern
Coal and Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937).
112. In Carmichae4 Chief Justice Stone wrote:
Even though it be assumed that the exercise of a sovereign power by a
state, in other respects valid, may be rendered invalid because of the
coercive effect of a federal statute enacted in the exercise of a power
granted to the national government such coercion is lacking here. It is un-
necessary to repeat now these considerations which have led us to our
decision in the Chas. C. Steward Machine Co. case, that the Social Security
Act has no coercive effect. As the Social Security Act is not coercive in
its operation, the Unemployment Compensation Act [the challenged state
enactment brought about as a result of the Social Security Act] cannot be
set aside as an unconstitutional product of coercion.
301 U.S. at 525-26.
113. See Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127 (1947). The State
of Oklahoma objected to Hatch Act provisions stipulating receipt of federal highway
funds was contingent on State Highway Commission employees not participating in
party politics. When presented with the tenth amendment argument, the Court, rely-
ing on Darby, stated:
The Tenth Amendment does not forbid the exercise of this power in the
way that Congress has proceeded in this case .... We do not see any
violation of the state's sovereignty in the hearing or order. Oklahoma
adopted the 'simple expedient' of not yielding to what she urges is
federal coercion.
Id. at 143-44.
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powers. Although the Court in National League of Cities limited its
decision to the commerce clause, many of the cases the Court utilized
in developing its concept of federalism were not commerce clause
cases. '14 The concept of federalism specifically enunciated in the tenth
amendment runs throughout the Constitution and operates as a
restraint on all the constitutional powers of the federal government
to prevent a usurpation of the States' sovereign powers. Accordingly,
any Public Employee Relations Act Congress would enact pursuant
to its spending power should be constitutionally prohibited.
The coercive effect of preconditioning the granting of funds to
cities and States upon an adoption of a federal Public Employee
Relations Act would materially aid the centralization of government
and the demise of State sovereignty. As the Court pointed out in
United States v. Butler, "the power to confer or withhold unlimited
benefits is the power to coerce or destroy. 1 5
The truth of this statement is painfully evident forty years
later. Federal funding of projects at the State and local levels has
made a quantum leap." 8 States and municipal budgets rely on
federal funds for over twenty percent of their income."7 Given a
federal tax bite which claims forty-eight percent of taxable cor-
porate income and up to seventy percent of individual earnings,
there is no real hope for a substantial increase in municipal and
State tax revenues. Additionally, the urban flight of the upper and
middle classes to suburbia has left many cities with declining prop-
erty values from which to tax."8
114. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (inter-governmental tax
immunity); Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926) (taxing power limited by
State sovereignty); Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) (federal government may
not impose requirements for admission to the Union which impairs the State's
sovereignty); Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1868) (state may refuse to
accept United States legal tender as payment of taxes); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 700 (1868) (contracts entered into by a state while controlled by a government
hostile to the United States were void).
115. 297 U.S. 1, 71 (1936).
116. For example, in 1959, the City of Kansas City, Missouri, received one hun-
dreth of one percent of its budget from federal funds. By 1976 federal assistance had
grown to nearly twenty-three percent of the total municipal expenditures. See Serviss,
Too Many Strings Attached-Federal Dollars and Local Government, OUTLOOK,
August-September, 1977, at 28.
117. Case & Rogers, Financing State and Local Governments: Crisis of the
1970's, CURRENT HISTORY Nov. 1975 at 183, 186.
118. Id. at 185. The authors suggest the difference between city and suburban
property tax bases is marked with an increasing gap. The problem is particularly
acute because city expenditures rise more rapidly than those of suburbs.
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The remaining poor and aged residents place great demands
upon the cities for services."9 Continued high rates of unemployment
have caused dramatic increases in the cost of social programs.l" The
increased reliance upon the public sector, coupled with its limited
financial resources, forced the cities into the dilemma of either cut-
ting back services, thereby hastening urban decline, or seeking
federal funding.
The infusion of revenue sharing and other federal aid to States
and municipalities has permitted maintenance of essential services.
A cut-off of these funds would cause "severe ... disruption in State
and local governments."12' Yet, former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey
Clark once asserted that the decision by State and local govern-
ments to receive federal funds with compliance standards is essen-
tially "voluntary."' 2 This statement overlooks the necessary reliance
by States and municipalities on federal funds and the onerous conse-
quences of any cut-off.
The Court in National League of Cities found that federally
authorized "pressures upon state budgets" posed unacceptably high
risks that adequate services would not be provided. 2 3 The pressure
imposed by the 1974 FLSA amendments would in fact be less than a
cut-off of federal funds to States and cities whose constituents have
relied upon these funds to maintain essential services. The displace-
ment of "required" governmental services, resulting from severance
of revenue sharing, is precisely the evil sought to be eradicated by
National League of Cities.
To permit unrestricted exercise of the spending power would
"effectively eviscerate a State's government and leave it an empty
vessel."'24 The conditions accompanying federal grants to the States
and cities should be reasonably related to the burdens imposed.115 If
119. Id. at 185.
120. Id. at 184.
121. Report issued by New Orleans Mayor Moon Landrieu and St. Louis Mayor
John Poelker, as co-chairman of Revenue Sharing Task Force of the National League
of Cities. The American City (Aug. 1975) p. 74. These sentiments were more recently
affirmed by Ralph Schlosstein, a Treasury Department official who told a National
League of Cities convention that elimination of the fourteen billion dollars in federal
aid to cities could result in layoffs, cuts in key services and tax boosts in many cities.
THE WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 1977, p. 1, col. 3.
122. 42 Op. ATT'Y. GEN. 331 at 336 (1966), citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447 (1923).
123. 426 U.S. 833, 847, 853 (1976).
124. Unraveling National League of Cities, supra, note 1.
125. An example of non-coercive exercise of Congress' spending power is the
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Congress desires to impose the NLRA on the States, let it also pro-
vide the funds necessary to meet the corresponding increase in their
salary budgets resulting from greater employee bargaining power.
The current proposal is, however, to link revenue sharing, upon
which the States rely, with election to enact a state labor relations
law covering public sector employees. The situation is analogous to
the local junkie mainlining the neighborhood children at no cost,
only to up the ante later.
The great reliance by States and cities on federal funding
guarantees that any preconditions attached to revenue sharing will
be met. A Public Employee Relations Act, enacted as a precondition
to such funds, would amount to federal interference with an essen-
tial element of state sovereignty, the power to determine wages and
hours of employees. ' " The result is no less pernicious because it was
passed by the States via federal coercion. Revitalizing United States
v. Butler would prohibit coercive exercise of the spending power to
accomplish ends otherwise unconstitutional (e.g., a National Public
Employee Relations Act). With the application of Butler, the Court
can continue to "arrest the downgrading of States to a role com-
parable to the departments of France, governed entirely out of a na-
tional capitol." '
C. Congressional Power to Enforce the Guarantees of the Four-
teenth Amendment as a Basis for an Act Governing Public
Employee Labor Relations
The majority in National League of Cities also declined to rule
whether Congress could, by exercising its authority under section
five of the fourteenth amendment, impair integral operations of
State and municipal governments."n Congress is empowered by vir-
tue of section five to enact any legislation necessary to enforce the
fourteenth amendment's guarantees"s (i.e., equal protection and due
process). Proponents of a National Public Employee Relations Act
assert that Congress' power under section five will support the
enactment of this legislation. These proponents assert the Act would
proposal to provide federal subsidies to States who elect to enact election-day voter
registration. The subsidies would be sufficient to defray all costs incurred; the States
not electing would not be cut off from any other funds. WALL ST. J., July 18, 1977, p.
1, col. 3.
126. 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
127. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 375 (1976) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
128. 426 U.S. 833, 853 n.17.
129. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article." U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 5.
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be "appropriate legislation" to enforce the guarantees of equal pro-
tection and freedom of association."3 They claim that public and
private sector employees are similarly situated, 1 and the disparity
in their collective bargaining rights is therefore a denial of equal
protection.
Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that this view is er-
roneous. Though Congress' power under section five of the four-
teenth amendment will overcome the tenth amendment's protection
of the States,"' the power granted Congress under the amendment
is not sufficiently broad to permit Congress to enact a public
employee relations act.
Congress' power under the fourteenth amendment has
undergone substantial revision in recent years. While the 1966
Supreme Court decision in Katzenbach v. Morgan" granted Con-
gress the power to interpret what is "appropriate legislation" to en-
force the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment,' its broad
language was overruled four years later in Oregon v. Mitchell."5
130. N.E.A. Proposal, supra, note 11 at 33.
131. See Fox, Federal Public Sector Labor Relations Legislation" The After-
math of National League of Cities v. Usery, 26 KAN. L. REV. 105 (1977). Fox suggests
that private and public employees are similarly situated but that public employers, as
public agencies, do not control their own funding. Id. at n.6.
132. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), the Court unanimously held
that a Title VII damage suit for back pay and attorneys' fees was not barred by the
eleventh amendment. While not directly involving the tenth amendment, the Court
discussed congressional power over the States under section five of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court stated the fourteenth amendment was intended to be a limit on
the power of the States and an enlargement of congressional power. Id. at 454-56.
Therefore, any valid exercise of congressional power under section five may override
the protection afforded the States by the tenth amendment. More recently, the
Supreme Court held that state and local governments were not immune from
monetary, declaratory and injunctive relief under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871. Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658
(1978). The decision, however, was based upon a reinterpretation of legislative intent
and did not discuss the tenth amendment implications.
133. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Cf. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), where the
Court stated: "[section five] does not invest Congress with power to legislate upon sub-
jects which are within the domain of state legislatures ..... [It] does authorize Con-
gress to provide modes of redress against the operation of state laws, and the action of
state officers executive or judicial, when these are subversive of the fundamental
rights specified in the amendment." Id. at 11.
134. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 659, 665-66 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing). This broad reading of section five was heralded as the most significant expansion
of congressional power since the depression Court broadened the scope of the com-
merce power. See Cox, Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 102-05 (1966).
135. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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Morgan upheld the suspension of literacy tests for voters with sixth
grade educations in Puerto Rican schools. One of the grounds of-
fered by the majority for sustaining the enactment was that Con-
gress might have believed the tests were being used to discriminate
against Puerto Ricans."M This broad reading of section five was
heralded as the most significant expansion of congressional power
since N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 8 The dissent" and
commentators'" viewed the majority opinion as standing "Marbury
v. Madison on its head by judicial deference to congressional inter-
pretation of the Constitution."" If Morgan were still the law, Con-
gress could theoretically determine that the disparate treatment of
public and private sector employment violates fourteenth amend-
ment guarantees and could, pursuant to its section five powers,
enact the proposed legislation.
The Morgan case was interpreted to empower Congress to
lower the voting age to eighteen in local, State and national elec-
tions under section five's grant to Congress to enforce equal protec-
tion.' Based in part on this interpretation, Congress lowered the
voting age in State, local and national elections in the Voting Rights
Act Amendment of 1970 pursuant to its section five powers."' The
Supreme Court, in Oregon v. Mitchel4 struck down these amend-
ments as applied to State and local elections." In limiting congres-
sional power under section five, Justice Black stated:
It cannot be successfully argued that the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to strip the States of their
power, carefully preserved in the original Constitution, to
govern themselves. The Fourteenth Amendment was surely
not intended to make every discrimination between
groups of people a constitutional denial of equal protec-
tion. Nor was the Fourteenth Amendment intended to
prohibit every discrimination between groups of people.'
136. 384 U.S. 641, 654-55 (1966).
137. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). In Jones & Laughlin, the Supreme Court broadened the
commerce power to include anything which "affected" interstate commerce.
138. 384 U.S. 641, 659, 665-66 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting (joined by Stewart,J.)).
139. Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 606 (1975) (hereinafter referred to as Cohen).
140. Id. at 606.
141. 116 Cong. Rec. 6934-36 (1970).
142. Pub. L. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970).
143. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
144. Id. at 127.
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Justice Black noted Congress made no legislative finding that the
twenty-one year old vote was used by the States to disenfranchise
voters on account of race."'
Justice Black would limit Congress' fourteenth amendment
powers to eradicating race discrimination.' While this was the ap-
parent intention of the drafters,"7 his view is not shared by the cur-
rent Court.' An analysis of the decisions interpreting section five
indicates that Congress can legislate and enforce clear constitutional
guarantees and remedy conditions which Congress specifically finds
lead to violations of the amendments.' But Congress cannot declare
State laws invalid as a denial of equal protection or the freedom of
association when in fact they do not violate these guarantees.'"
The absence of a National Public Employee Relations Act does
not amount to a constitutional violation of an individual's positive
rights of association, free speech, petition, equal protection, or due
process. 15' While there is little doubt that public employees may
belong to labor oganizations,"' the courts have almost unanimously
145. I& at 130.
146. 1& at 126-127.
147. In Ex parte Virginia, the Court stated:
One great purpose of these Amendments was to raise the colored race
from that condition of inferiority and servitude in which most of them had
previously stood into perfect equality of civil rights with all other persons
within the jurisdiction of the States .... They were intended to be, what
they really are, limitations of the power of the States and enlargments of
the power of Congress. 100 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1880).
A recent exhaustive historical analysis of the guarantees intended by the fourteenth
amendment framers indicates they merely sought to constitutionalize a few "fund-
amental" rights such as the freedom to contract and own property. See R. BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
(Harvard Press, 1977). The Court has never been restrained by this intent. Rather, it
has engaged in selectively incorporating most of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth
amendment as well as certain penumbral rights such as the "right to privacy". E.g.,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
148. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). There was no dispute that in
enacting the 1972 amendment to Title VII, Congress exercised its power under section
five of the fourteenth amendment.
149. Cohen, supra, note 139 at 618-19.
150. AL
151. Beauboeuf v. Delgado College, 428 F.2d 470, 471 (5th Cir. 1970);
Indianapolis Education Association v. Lewallen, 72 L.R.R.M. 2071 (7th Cir. 1969);
United Steelworkers v. University of Alabama, 430 F. Supp. 996, 1001 (N.D. Ala. 1977).
152. Lontain v. Vandeave, 483 F.2d 966 (10th Cir. 1973); Orr v. Thorpe, 427
F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1970); A.F.S.C.M.E. v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969);
McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); Vorbeck v. McNeal, 407 F. Supp.
733 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (striking provisions of a state public sector bargaining law which
prohibited police from belonging to labor organizations).
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rejected the expansion of a'ssociational rights beyond the right to
join such organizations. 15
The right to associate with those of one's own choosing does
not require recognition of a public employee labor organization and
public employees may not insist upon collective bargaining with
their public employer, for as the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
observed in Indianapolis Education Association v. Lewallen "'
The gravamen of the compliant goes to the failure on the
part of the [school board] to bargain collectively in good
faith. But there is no constitutional duty to bargain collec-
tively with an exclusive bargaining agent. Such duty,
when imposed, is imposed by statute. The refusal of the
[board] to bargain in good faith does not equal a constitu-
tional violation of the [union's] positive rights of associa-
tion, free speech, petition, equal protection, or due pro-
cess. Nor does the fact that the agreement to collectively
bargain may be enforceable against a state elevate a con-
tractual right to a constitutional right.'55
The rule enunciated in Lewallen has been extended to deny public
employee unions the right to particular grievance procedures'56 and
the right to the use of the public employer's facilities.'57
Similarly, the refusal of a State to accord its employees the
same bargaining rights enjoyed by employees in private industry
presents no violation of either the due process or equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment." This does not mean they
have fewer rights and privileges than other citizens of the United
States, for they enjoy all the rights and privileges afforded by the
Constitution. Rather, it is a recognition that while public employees
may associate and advocate unionism, they may not, in the absence
153. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 728, 734-38 (1971).
154. 72 L.R.R.M. 2071 (7th Cir. 1969).
155. Id. at 2072.
156: Teachers Local 1954 v. Hanover Community School Corp. 457 F.2d 456
(7th Cir. 1972); Beauboeuf v. Delgado College, 428 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1970); Confedera-
tion of Police v. Chicago, 382 F. Supp. 624 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Winston-Salem/Forsyth County
Unit, N.C. Ass'n. of Educ. v. Phillips, 381 F. Supp. 644 (M.D.N.C. 1974); Atkins v. City
of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
157. Teachers Local 858 v. School Dist. No. 1, 314 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Colo. 1970)
(the grant of school facilities only to the union selected by the teachers in a representa-
tion election did not impair the losing union's rights to organize).
158. Beauboeuf v. Delgado College, 428 F.2d 470, 471 (5th Cir. 1970); United
Steelworkers v. University of Alabama, 430 F. Supp. 996, 1001 (N.D. Ala. 1977).
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of a State statute so requiring, compel their public employer to
recognize and bargain with a union."' As one decision has stated:
"When they ... seek to force their public employer to recognize or
bargain with a union they have gone beyond the outer limits of their
constitutional protections of free expression and association . . .""
Public employees have no right guaranteed by the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the benefits afforded
employees of private industry.'
Disparate treatment afforded employees in the private and
public sectors is rationally based. Public employees have rights not
afforded their private sector counterparts which are granted under
statutes, civil services rules and regulations, and the procedural
guarantees of due process upon termination of employment. 2
Moreover, many of the public services performed by the cities and
States are unique, having no counterpart in the private sector.
There exists no competitor to provide necessary services during
periods of labor strife. Government may not operate with a "public
be damned" attitude as the government owes its entire being to the
will of the people it serves.
To support congressional enactment of the proposed public
employee relations acts under section five of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the proposed law must be necessary to enforce some constitu-
tional guarantee. No constitutional violations are presented by the
current treatment of State and municipal employees. Private and
public sector employees are not similarly situated. Affording rights
to one and not the other does not, therefore, amount to a denial of
equal protection.'" Alternatively, since public employees are granted
the right to join unions, their freedom of association is not abridged.
Without the basis of a constitutional question or a finding that cur-
rent State laws are being utilized to deny public employees their
freedom of association, Congress is without power under section five
to enact the proposed public employee relations acts.
V. CONCLUSION
Applying the doctrine of federalism, the proposed federal
regulation of the employment relationship between a State and its
159. Johnson v. City of Albany, Ga., 413 F. Supp. 782, 797 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
160. Id. at 797.
161. Beaufoeuf v. Delgado College, 428 F.2d 470, 471 (5th Cir. 1970).
162. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1974); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593 (1972).
163. Beauboeuf v. Delgado College, 428 F.2d 470, 471 (5th Cir. 1970).
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employees is prohibited. The Court, in National League of Cities v.
Usery, recognized the concept of federalism embodied in the tenth
amendment as a shield protecting the States in the discharge of
their traditional sovereign powers from impermissible federal en-
croachment. One of the inherent elements of this federalism is the
authority of the States to make those fundamental employment deci-
sions upon which the States' systems of performance must rest. Con-
gress, therefore, may not, through the exercise of its commerce
clause powers, impose a Public Employee Relations Act on the
States.
Similarly, the concept of federalism woven into the very fabric
of the Constitution prohibits Congress from constitutionally reduc-
ing the States to the role of mere departments governed entirely
out of Washington by the exercise of either its spending powers or
the powers granted in section five of the fourteenth amendment.
Congress may not by guile obtain a result the Constitution prohibits
it from achieving directly, for in the words of Chief Justice Mar-
shall:
Is the proposition to be maintained that the Constitution
meant to prohibit names and not things? That a very im-
portant act, big with great and ruinous mischief, which is
expressly forbidden by words most appropriate for its
description, may be performed by the substitution of a
name? That the Constitution, in one of its most important
provisions, may be openly evaded by giving a new name
to an old thing? We cannot think so.'
A system of government recognizing the inherent sovereignty
of each of the partners in our federal system is essential for the
preservation of our individual liberties. States' rights is not a mere
truism. Rather, it is a basic element in our constantly evolving
system of government. Congress should not so lightly move to im-
pair the constitutional adhesive which has for so long preserved our
Union.
164. Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410, 433 (1830).
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